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A. Two mo dels of international human rights monitoring
Human rights monitoring has been an established par of the international
political landscape for the past two decades. From the pioneering work of
Amnesty International in the 1960s, we have moved to a situation today in
which a large number of groups, including Human Rights Watch and the
United States Department of State, produce comprehensive annual monitoring
reports of growing sophistication and value. Most of these monitoring
enterprises share a common implicit modeL.
The policies and practices of Southern hemisphere countries have been
emphasized. Much less attention has been given to the practices of Northern
countries.
- National (domestic ) human rights practices have been emphasized.
Relatively litte attention has been paid to the human rights consequences of
the international actions of foreigners.
- Civil and political rights have been given principal emphasis. Relatively
little attention has been paid to monitoring economic, social, and cultural
rights.
- State policies have been monitored extensively. Very litte attention has
been paid to the human rights consequences of the activities of businesses,
private individuals, and other nonstate actors.
- Monitoring has been done primarily by outsiders, which we wil refer to as
external monitoring. Internal or self-monitoring has been largely ignored.
Human Rights in Developing Countries (HRDC) -- the yearbook produced
since 1985 by human rights research institutes in Norway, the NetherIands,
Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, i which we wil refer to collectively as the
Northern European Democracies (NEDs) -- has given equal weight to civil and
political and economic, social, and cultural rights, in sharp contrast to other
major monitoring efforts. Otherwise, however, it has shared the model of
Northern monitoring of Southern country national human rights practices.
We greatly admire both the initiative of the cooperating human rights
institutes and the substance of the individual country reports and thematic
essays in HRDC. Nonetheless, we believe that it is time for the international
human rights community to move toward a monitoring model that is both more
balanced and reflects greater culturally and political sensitivity. HRDC, we
believe, is well positioned to lead this change.
Rather than focus on external monitoring of the national human rights
practices of Southern hemisphere recipient countries, primary emphasis should
be given to self-monitoring of donor-country international human rights
These are the five current cooperating countries. In the past, Canada and Finland have also been involved.
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policies and practices.2 This should include the activities of nonstate actors.
And the emphasis in HRDC on economic, social, and cultural rights should be
maintained and strengthened.
Such a reorientation would
focus efforts on things over which the governments of the cooperating
institutes have the most control.
- allow HRDC to lead the international human rights community toward a
richer and more sophisticated understanding of the politics of human rights.
- better use scarce resources by reducing redundancy with other monitoring
efforts.3
- provide a more distinctive and valuable product.
- demonstrate an exemplary wilingness to eng age in public self-criticism,
while also showing greater respect for the cultural, historical, and political
sensitivities of governments and citizens in recipient countries.
Human rights monitoring is an indirect form of human rights advocacy. Our
hope is that sustained and intensive self-monitoring wil lead to improvements
in the development assistance and human rights policies, both direct and
indirect, of the NEDs (Northern European Democracies). The result would be
an even more distinctive "middle power" course for the NEDs that better
reflects their national values and their international position.
L. The Old Way: External Monitoring of Recipients
At least five important audiences for HRDC can be identified: governments in
recipient countries; governments in donor countries; human rights advocates in
recipient countries; human rights advocates in donor countries; scholars,
students, and informed members of the general public. None of these
audiences would receive sufficient benefit from a continued focus on external
monitoring of recipient country human rights practices to justify continuing that
emphasis in the yearbooks.
The cooperating institutes seem particularIy poorIy situated to provide
information that would influence the practices of monitored governments.
Despite the high quality of their individual country reports, the institutes lack
the resources to undertake major original work of a comprehensive nature.
They are unlikely to be able to provide much information that is not already
available to these governments, either through their own sources or in the
The four reports in the 1995 edition of HRDC on Austrian, Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian aid-rights
linkages suggest that such changes are already under way. We want to encourage that they be formalized,
extended, and made the heart of future yearbooks.
When the yearbooks were initially conceived, the problem of duplication was less severe. Other efforts,
particularly those of Human Rights Watch, were much less thorough than today. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, when there was considerable bias in often-cited US sources (especially the State Department and Freedom
House reports), there was also a real need for a neutral voIce. HRDC's distinctive voIce remains valuable, as we
emphasize in Section A.2.b below. Nonetheless, as an external monitoring project, the yearbook is only one of
several (increasingly good) competitors.
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reports of other monitors, such as the United States Department of State,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the Minority Rights Group.
Reporting directed to human rights advocates and publics in monitored
countries would seem to be almost as unpromising an endeavor. Again, little
new information is likely to be made available. Quasi-official external
verification of information may have been valuable to human rights activists in
highly repressive countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This is rarely the case
today, especially in the countries where the NEDs have focused their aid
activities. Supporting local human rights advocates is an admirable goal.
Information disseminated by the NED human rights institutes, however, is
unlikely to make much of a contribution to its realization.
Continued monitoring of recipient country human rights practices might be
of some use to those working in the foreign ministries or aid agencies of donor
governments. Although Human Rights in Developing Countries is unlikely to
provide fundamentally new information, it provides a very useful summar
compilation. This may be especially valuable for officials new to a posting or
interested in countries for which they do not have direct responsibility. The
yearbooks may even be able to package the available information in ways that
suggest new perspectives or insights. We believe, however, that there are
greater opportunities for influencing government officials and bureaucrats by
emphasizing their own responsibilties and shifting attention to the often
unintended human rights consequences of their own actions.
Donor country publics and human rights advocates, and human rights
scholars and students, stand in a similar position. HRDC may provide
authoritative confirmation of facts, but disputes over facts are rarely of much
policy significance today, especially in the NEDs (in contrast to, say, the
United States in the 1980s). Again, the major contribution is convenient
packaging of information.
We thus conclude that to the extent that it continues to emphasize donor
country monitoring of recipients, Human Rights in Developing Countries wil
have both a small market and limited impact. To the extent that officials and
human rights advocates have relied on HRDC for recipient country information
in the past, there wil be costs to self-monitoring. Nonetheless, we believe that
self-monitoring of donor country international human rights practices is a much
better way to use the scarce resources of the cooperating human rights institutes
and wil position them to make a unique contribution to improved international
human rights policies.
. 2. The New Way: Self-Monitoring
In addition to creatively revitalizing the NED yearbooks, self-monitoring would
address two major concerns raised by the enterprise of monitoring by
developed country agencies. The first is consistency, both between national
and international human rights policies and within a country's foreign policy.
The second is the need for historical and cultural sensitivity, which has often
been drawn to Northerners' attention by human rights scholars and activists in
the South.
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a. Moral and Political Consistency
Many people who live in the North are uneasy about the disparity between how
citizens are treated within their own society and how their country responds to
the human rights of those living elsewhere. Northern governments rest much
of their political legitimacy on internal practices that aim to realize
internationally recognized human rights. Yet in their dealings with other states,
especially with poorer and weaker states, these same governments often allow
considerations of human rights to lapse. Furthermore, organizations and
individuals who are expected to give full respect to human rights in the North
are permitted to ignore those same rights in the South. Thus an employer
expected to respect safety standards and trade union rights in the North may
with impunity violate these rights in many foreign countries. International
human rights instruments give primary responsibilty for implementing
internationally recognized human rights to sovereign territorial states. But
these rights are also recognized as universal rights. Therefore, states are at
least free, within the limits of sovereignty, to act on their behalf. They may
even have an obligation to do SO.4 Certainly it seems morally obtuse not to be
troubled by, and attempt to reduce, the typical disparity between national and
international responses to respect for and violation of internationally
recognized human rights. An aggressive strategy of self-monitoring could
contribute to reducing this problem.
In addition to this moral, and primarily national, dimension, there is an
international political dimension to the problem of (in)consistency. Jf states
appear to treat similar human rights violations differently -- sanctioning
violations in some countries but not in others, or responding with different
policies when faced with similar violations -- they risk losing the moral high
ground, and thus weakening their policies. Even if only states guilty of serious
violations are targeted, one's international human rights policies are open to the
charge of political motivation and bias unless all states guilty of comparable
violations are targeted. This was a common, and legitimate, complaint during
much of the 1970s and 1980s, when, for example, Chile was the subject of
extensive international action for violations that were largely ignored in other
countries, such as Brazil.
The desire for consistency, however, runs up against the fact of competing
objectives. At the most generalIeveL, territorial sovereignty, the central
organizing principle of contemporary international relations, restricts the reach
of Northern governments. For example, to control the labor practices of firms
abroad smacks of extraterfitoiial legislation that ilegitimately intervenes in the
internal affairs of other states. Given the strong interest of NED governments
in protecting their own sovereign rights, these restrictions become a very
serious matter.
The moral nature of this obligation is clear. Legally, the issue is more problematie. Nonetheless, Article 55
of the UN Charter requires states to take joint and separate action to recognize internationally recognized human
rights and fundamental freedoms. However vague this requirement, it does suggest legal responsibility to
contribute to realizing human rights abroad.
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More particularIy, human rights objectives face competition from other
national interests. Human rights is but one part of a comprehensive foreign
policy. Other interests that must be incorporated include security
arrangements, political allances, international law, population movements, and
-- not least by any means -- trade and investment. In the tradeoff between
competing objectives, inconsistency in international human rights activities
seems unavoidable. Even if there is a deeper overall foreign policy consistency
in the resulting actions, this can undercut the specific human rights dimension
of foreign policy. 5
Self-monitoring cannot eliminate such inconsistencies. It can, however,
alert policy makers to the ways their actions may be perceived by those with a
more focused human rights perspective. By providing aregular reminder of the
problem, and emphasizing that it is a problem, self-monitoring may lead to
more self-conscious tradeoffs between human rights and other foreign policy
concerns. By placing the issue of tradeoffs under regular scrutiny, subtle
pressures may even be exerted to take human rights more seriously, especially
in parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy that do not have a primar and
explicit human rights mandate. Self-monitoring may also help to overcome the
understandable, and perhaps even appropriate, tendency of bureaucrats to
become absorbed in the details of implementing particular policies. The
likelihood of such positive consequences is particularIy high if we can assume
good faith on the part of the governments, good relations between monitors and
those being studied, and a joint commitment to cooperative improvements in
policy and practice as a result of dialogue and persuasive argument --
conditions that seem to hold in the NEDs.
States have rarely defined human rights in parts of the worId not under their
own sovereignty as a vital interest, in the classic sense of an interest that when
seriously threatened wil ordinarily provoke aresponse involving the threat or
use of force. But there is a great distance between such vital interests and the
minimal penetration of human rights concerns in the foreign policy of the
NEDs (and other states as well) just two decades ago. A consistent, sustained
program of comprehensive self-monitoring would provide policy-makers,
activists, citizens, and scholars with a much clearer sense of the progress (or
lack of progress) of human rights as an objective of foreign policy. And such
information may itself contribute to administrative and political efforts to bring
about further pro gress.
Activists and governments, however, often face situations in which the
actions politically available to them are almost certain to have little or no
concrete impact on the human rights practices of the target government. The
result is a choice between inaction and largely symbolic acts of "witnessing";
that is, acting from respect for one's own moral values. Each option is in a
certain sense inconsistent. Symbolic acts of witness, however, at least maintain
a considerable degree of moral consistency.
For example, initial Norwegian sanctions against South Africa exempted shipping. Conversely, Canadian
trade sanctions on South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s in part reflected the minuseule volume of trade. At the
same time, Canada maintained surprisingly cordial relations with Indonesia.
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Policies of witness also under score the fact that any inconsistency arises
from the lack of affordable means to achieve moral goals. And they make the
important moral point that severely repulsive, gross human rights violations
should not even appear to be condoned: "it ultimately remains a moral and
political responsibilty to suspend aid, if it can be shown that receiving
governments violate human rights in a systematic and serious manner.,,6 Jf
such symbolic acts of witness become a regular part of the policies of a great
number of countries, they may even have an impact in the long run by altering
the national and international normative environment.
The "practical" orientation of foreign ministries, however, may lead to an
undervaluing of witnessing, and thus greater moral inconsistency than
necessary. Intensive self-monitoring may counter this tendency. In any case,
by keeping the focus on the actions of Northern governments and private
actors, it underscores the importance of striving for consistency even in
difficult situations.
Some of the issues raised here can be ilustrated by Dutch policy toward
Indonesia. The 1995 Yearbook tells the story of the stormy relations between
Indonesia and the NetherIands over issues of human rights, culminating in
Indonesian terminating the aid relationship in 1992.7 Although the severe
human rights violations of the 1960s in Indonesia were not a major public
concern of Dutch foreign policy, "from 1977 on, the Dutch Government tried to
raise informally the human rights issue" in aid consortium meetings.8 In 1990,
in response to new political executions, 27 milion guilders in aid was
withdrawn. Following the announcement of further executions, the Dutch
raised the issue at the Council of Ministers of the EC. Throughout 1991,
Minister for Development Cooperation J an Pronk continued public criticisms
of the Indonesian record. And following the Dili massacre in November 1991,
which brought ongoing human rights problems in East Timor into the
international spotlight, another 27 milion guilders in aid was suspended.
These actions were not easy. Because of their sensitivity over former
colonial relations, the Dutch were especially vulnerable to Indonesian
arguments of paternalism. In addition, substantial commercial interests cut
against acting on human rights concerns. Nonetheless, the government of the
NetherIands did take relatively forceful and public actions that had costs for
their relations with Indonesia.
The actions, however, were largely symbolic. Trade and other economic
relations were not included in the sanctions, and in fact increased.
Furthermore, Dutch aid was not only modest -- less than two percent of total
1992 pledges to Indonesia9 -- but readily replaced by Japan and other providers.
~~a van Cranenburgh, "Development Cooperation and Human Rights: Linkage Policies in the Netherlands",
HRDC 1995,p-:7---- --------- ------ - - - -- - -- --
Peter Baehr, Hilde Selbervik, and Arne Tostensen, "Responses to Human Rights Critcism: Kenya-Norway
and Indonesia-the Netherlands," HRDC 1995 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), pp. 57-87 at pp.
73-82.
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., Table 2.
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Baehr, Selbervik, and Tostensen thus conclude that "the case shows that the
linking of aid to the observance of human rights is unlikely to be effective,
unless the amount of aid involved is quite substantial or there is a sufficient
degree of international support. Both were singularIy lacking in the Dutch
position toward Indonesia." 10
Although true as far as it goes, this ignores the costs of the alternative of less
forceful action. Given the prominent place assigned to human rights in Dutch
foreign and development assistance policy, the close and longstanding
relationship with Indonesia, and the prior record of suspending aid to Suriname
in the 1980s, consistency demanded a strong response. And the failure of
Holland's alles to cooperate did not absolve it of its moral and political
obligations to act on its own values and policies.
Reasonable analysts may disagree about how to balance these competing
concerns. Nonetheless, Dutch actions, despite their failure to bring about
significant concrete improvements in Indonesian human rights practices,
reflected an admirable human rights consistency. Furthermore, we would
suggest that the change in Dutch policy in the 1990s toward a less lenient
response to Indonesian human rights violations can be explained in part by the
cumulative force of arguments by human rights activists and the power of the
moral and political demand for consistency.
The NEDs, or any other state, may legitimately choose to focus on human
rights issues that they believe are important, even if the aid-recipient countries
might prefer that those issues be ignored. Consider the case of disadvantaged
or at risk groups. Whether or not a Southern country puts priority on the rights
of children, for example, the NEDs might wish to stress them, especially given
the advanced social policies in respect to children's rights of some NEDs. The
same could be said of policies supportive of the rights of women. One might
even argue that moral consistency for the NEDs legitimates, or even requires,
some emphasis on gay rights in aid-recipient countries.
We do not want to minimize the difficulties and complexites of such
consistency. The near universal acceptance of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child -- all but six countries in the worId are currently paries to the treaty --
makes an emphasis on children's rights relatively unproblematic. A focus on
gay rights, by contrast, probably would be considered culturally offensive by
most Southern governments and their populations. Nonetheless, even here the
moral consistency of the policy may mitigate charges of cultural insensitivity.
A donor country can legitimately argue that it is trying to live up to its own
principles.
Self-monitoring cannot guarantee greater moral or political consistency at
either the national or internationallevels. We do not even claim that complete
consistency. would be desirable. There are limits to the costs the Dutch should
be expected to bear on behalf of the citizens of Indonesia in general or the
people of East Timor in particular. Individual governments may legitimately
decide that the costs of consistency in pursuing gay rights abroad are
10
Ibid., p. 82.
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unacceptably high. Nonetheless, regular self-monitoring can contribute to
improved policy by assuring that such issues are regularIy raised.
b. Cultural and Historical Sensitivity
Moral consistency responds to the charge of hypocrisy frequently levelled
against Northern powers. Two other steps can be taken that address related
charges of cultural and historical insensitivity.
First, the very act of self-monitoring responds to Southern concerns of
neocolonial paternalism. The focus shifts to how the NEDs themselves
contribute to respect for or violation of human rights in the South. Instead of
constantly criticizing the South, the NEDs wil be self-critical.
Such a reorientation would focus the attention of NED monitors on what
c1early is their business: the human rights consequences of the activities of
their own governments, organizations, and citizens. This suggests respect for
notions of propriety: attending to one's own actions as much as the actions of
others. It would create an unprecedented sense of balance in international
human rights monitoring. It may even help to enhance the moral authority of
criticisms that are leveled against Third W orId governments.
Second, cultural sensitivity can be enhanced by emphasizing economic,
social, and cultural rights and their interdependence with civil and political
rights. Northern human rights monitors have long been criticized for their
inordinate focus on civil and political rights. In the case of the U.S.
Department of State reports, this criticism has considerable validity. It is also
true of the most prominent Northern NGO monitors, Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. Fortunately, however, it is a largely inaccurate criticism
of HRDC.
The yearbooks, as well as the governments of the sponsoring institutes, have
been strongly committed to the interdependence and indivisibilty of all
internationally recognized human rights. Their emphasis on the authoritative
nature of the standards laid out in the Universal Dec1aration of Human Rights
and the International Human Rights Covenants -- in contrast to, for example,
the more selective standards used by the United States -- also protects against
charges of bias or insensitivity. There has also been an exemplar wilingness
to consider the international context that makes realization of economic rights
particularly difficult in the South. Yet HRDC never diminishes the importance
of civil and political rights.
Continued use of .this basic framework wil provide strong safeguards
against the charge of cultural insensitivity. We recommend that future
yearbooks provide a more explicit discussion of these issues, in order to more
c1earIy distance themselves from complaints that apply to other monitoring
endeavors.
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B. A strategy for self-monitoring
This section lays out an inventory of forums and activities to be considered in a
comprehensive self-monitoring program. We identify bilateral, multilateral,
and transnational activities that have either an explicit human rights foC?us or
significant indirect human rights consequences. Using such a comprehensive,
explicit framework can be especially useful by drawing attention to instances of
inaction that might otherwise be overIooked. In addition, it should encourage a
more careful consideration of the relation between ends and means in the
actions of monitored governments.
We emphasize the multiplicity of issues and arenas that have direct or
indirect human rights implications in order to focus atten ti on on the penetration
of a concern for human rights into the full range of NED foreign policies. The
inventory we present can be used to chart the number, range, and importance of
other foreign policy concerns to which human rights are in practice explicitly
linked. This would provide a rough measure of the extent to which offcial
statements of concern have actually penetrated the foreign policy decision
making process.
A comprehensive inventory is also important because of the growing
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights. With the dramatic rise of
economic ideologies that leave growing numbers of Third W orId citizens
subject to the not so tender mercies of markets, and the growing influence of
international financial institutions dominated by a neo-classical belief in the
unalloyed wonders of those markets, new challenges exist. These wil be at the
heart of our concerns here.
A special emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights also is implied
in any self-monitoring strategy. Foreign governments and firms typically have
minimal direct controlover respect for most civil and political rights. They
of ten, however, are in a position to influence economic, social, and cultural
rights directly, most obviously through offcial development assistance
programs and the employment practices of foreign firms.
The NEDs have been leaders in efforts to link human rights and
development assistance in constructive ways. It is our impression, however,
that even in the NEDs there are neither the administrative structures nor
bureaucratic habits of mind to respond adequately to the new challenges and
opportunities of the contemporary human rights situation. By emphasizing
these sorts of linkages, HRDC could make a potentially important contribution.
L. Bilateral Activities
Offcial bilateral relations are those over which states have the most direct
control as well as those that give the clearest indication of support or
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disapproval. Therefore, they must be at the heart of any self-monitoring
scheme.
Public and private human rights diplomacy obviously needs to be
monitored. Expressions of concern, initiatives on behalf of individual victims,
the recall of envoys, and similar standard mechanisms of diplomatic
communication and influence must be monitored. Attention must also be paid
to positive as well as negative means. Do significant improvements receive
appropriate nott or praise? Has praise for improvement been given
prematurely or excessively? In addition, inaction as well as action must be
considered. In particular, have comparable violations that have received
criticism elsewhere gone unaddressed? Such questions, however, have been
relatively frequently addressed. We wil focus our attention on other aspects of
bilateral relations.
a. Bilateral Aid
Development assistance policies present an obvious starting point. Aid is a
symbolic measure of support, a potential direct contributor to improved
enjoyment of economic and social rights, and a prominent explicit instrument
of human rights policy in the NEDs. It is also, however, a relatively well
studied topic. For example, a report prepared at the University of Antwerp
provides a thorough conceptual review of the issue, supplemented by studies of
donor and recipient country policies.I1 The 1995 Yearbook provides good
surveys of Austrian, Danish, and Dutch policies and practices. The subject is
even beginning to be treated in book-length studies.I2 Furthermore, NED
governments have already given considerable attention to aid-rights linkages.
Therefore, we wil make only two brief comments before mo ving on to other
activities that have not been so clearIy linked to human rights in the practice of
the NEDs.
First, it is essential to monitor actual human rights consequences. Figures
on allocations and disbursements may be a measure of foreign policy
cooperation but they have no obvious or necessary connection to the human
rights consequences of that aid. Monitors must look at the details of carrying
out particular projects, considering not only explicit human rights commtments
made in the design of the project but also the unintended consequences of the
actual project once implemented. Because such detailed project assessments
are as important as they are difficult and rare, HRDC could make an important
contribution by sponsoring a series of .such studies in future yearbooks.
Second, the complexities of aid conditionality must be addressed. For
example, Cuba's poor record on civil and political rights, which might suggest
that it is an inappropriate subject for NED aid, has long be en coupled with
11 Koen de Feyter, Kaat Landuyt, Filip Reyntjens, and Stef Vandenginste, Development Co-operation: A Tool
for the Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy? An Interim Report, Institute of Development Policy and
Management and Department of Law, University of Antwerp, August 1994, p. 114.
12 See, e.g., David Gilies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South Relations,
Montreal: McGil-Queens University Press, 1996.
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aggressive and effective initiatives on health care and education of the sort that
the NEDs have usually been anxious to support. More generally, suspension of
well-designed aid may harm those who are already suffering. We have no
ready answers to such problems. We are not even sure what simple human
rights consistency would demand. We do believe, however, that careful
self-monitoring can at least iluminate the nature of the problem in particular
cases and contribute to more thoughtful policy.
b. Bilateral Trade and Investment
Bilateral trade and investment should, in our view, be a no less important
subject of self-monitoring. Although most NED trade and investment is
ostensibly private activity, NED governments engage in a variety of trade
promotion and investment support schemes. Trade and investment also is often
taken as a measure of indirect support.
Bilateral economic relations also often present a measure of the extent of a
state's commtment to human rights. Disrupting trade or investment has direct
material costs for the sanctioning state -- in sharp contrast to aid suspensions,
which have material costs only for recipient countries. A wilingness to
undertake such self-denying actions expresses an unusually strong commtment
to human rights. Conversely, a failure to include trade and investment in
sanctions, especially if they involve reductions in development assistance,
leaves a state open to charges of hypocrisy: for all the talk of principles, profit
in the end appears to win out.
Boycotts, embargoes, and similar punitive sanctions, however, are
problematic instruments of human rights policy. The consequences to the
victims can be quite severe, as is currently evident in Iraq and Cuba. Sanctions
are also unlikely to work without astrong civil society in the target country that
supports the aims of the sanctions. And they are an especially difficult
instrument of bilateral policy because of the collective action problems they
pose: without broad international support, they wil simply enrich other states
that do not cooperate. Therefore, in thinking about linking human rights to
trade and investment, it would be a mistake to focus too heavily on direct
punitive sanctions.
Likewise, it would be misguided to focus only on negative trade and
investment policies. Positive inducements, such as preferential rates on credits
for trade with rights-protective regimes, also need to be considered. Such
measures are both, lon¡ cost and.unusually congi;uent with. broader NED values
and foreign policy orientations. A self-monitoring scheme that stresses positive
inducements as well as negative sanctions could make a valuable contribution
to the closer integration of human rights concerns into bilateral trade and
investment policies.
Export promotion and investment insurance programs are an obvious and
important subject for monitoring. Is human rights taken into account in these
decisions? If so, when and how? Our impression is that human rights are at
best unsystematically integrated into trade and investment programs in the
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NEDs. Regular self-monitoring could at least point out this apparent
inconsistency.
Monitors would also need to consider import policies. For example,
discriminatory tariffs, especially on agricultural products, and nontariff barriers,
especially on textiles, deny citizens of Third WorId countries jobs to protect
those of developed country citizens. Although politically understandable, this
is morally problematic.
Special attention should also be paid to victims of the productive process. Is
child labor prohibited by international human rights law used? Prison or slave
labour? Are trade union rights respected? The rights of migrant workers? Are
indigenous peoples displaced or exploited? We wil return to these issues in
the discussion of transnational corporate activity below.
c. Other Bilateral Relations
Trade in armaments is another important subject for self-monitoring. It
deserves separate consideration both because the arms trade typically is driven
by political as well as economic motives and because of the frequent use of
foreign arms by repressive regimes against theIr own citizens. Although NED
exports of arms are small, 
13 they may be significant in particular cases.
Rwanda has drawn the worId's attention to the potential significance of trade in
even relatively small amounts of weapons.I4 As the attention of analysts of
peace and war turns more to civil wars, rather than the nuclear war so feared
until 1991, perhaps the time has come to integrate peace monitoring and human
rights monitoring into one combined effort and to investigate what regulations
pertain to arms exports. This may be an area where productive cooperation
with peace research institutes in the NEDs could be pursued.
Sports, cultural exchanges, educational links, and similar sorts of bilateral
relations also need to be monitored. These are of ten manipulated by
governments to show their disapproval of specific policies by other
governments. South Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s provides the
c1assic example. Considerations of symbolism, efficacy, and harming the
victims that were raised above are also c1earIy relevant here.
2. Multilateral Activities
The multilateral dimension of foreign policy is especially important for the
NEDs.For,reasonsofbothprincipleand practicality,these small states have
given special emphasis to multilateral international cooperation.
Self-monitoring must include a similar emphasis.
13 In 1994, the Netherlands exported USD 110m. in arms, Sweden USD 60 m., Norway USD 50m., and
Denmark USD 10m. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer
(http://www.acda.gov/wmeat95/contnt95.htm). table Il.
14 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Rwanda/Zaire: rearming with Impunity", Human Rights Watch 7, no. 4,
May 1995.
CMI-report 13
a. International Financial Institutions
One area of human rights monitoring that needs explicit development is the
monitoring of international financial institutions (IFIs), especially the WorId
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the South as it was
in the North, the cost of introducing efficient capitalism is likely to be several
decades of inequitable distribution of wealth and personal insecurity for the
lower classes. We know this, from both historical and contemporary
experience. To fail to attempt to mitigate such suffering is morally
problematic, even shameful -- especially for the NEDs, who at home have
staked so much on sheltering their own populations from the painful
consequences of market efficiency.
The most important human rights dimension of international financial
institution activity today is structural adjustment. The direct human rights
consequences of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are well known.Is
SAPs almost always have immediate and detrimental short-term effects on the
enjoyment of economic rights by large segments of the population. Reductions
in state spending on education and health, retrenchments in public sector
employment, reductions in real wages, and programs to privatize land leave the
poor even more vulnerable than they were before.
In addition, the political costs to governments forced to institute unpopular
and often punitive cuts in social services may also disrupt the pace and process
of political liberalization and democratization. Governments forced to face
street riots over dramatic increases in food prices, as occurred in several
African countries in the 1980s, pay a heavy political price for
externally-imposed financial discipline. Even if they do lead eventually to
more efficient economies, with a greater capacity to realize economic and
social rights, externally imposed structural adjustment programs typically cause
considerable political unrest, which can impede not only economic efficiency
but progress in implementing civil and political rights.I6 Furthermore, the
surprisingly poor record of SAPs in achieving their stated economic
objectives17 makes these human rights sacrifices even more problematic.
15 See e.g. Sigrun r. Skogly, "Human Rights and Economic Efficiency: The Relationship between Social Costs
of Adjustment and Human Rights Protection", in HRDC 1994.
16 See Linda Camp Keith and Steven C. Poe, (Department of Political Science, University of North Texas,
Denton, TXl "The United States, the IMF, and Human Rights: A Policy Relevant Approach," paper presented at
the 15th Hendricks Symposium, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, September 21, 1996. Tables 3 and 4 showa
statistically significant increase inviolations of personal integrity rights by countries participating in IMF
structural adjustment programs. See also James Franklin, "Protest, Political Repression and the International
Monetary Fund," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Associate, March
1995; and Henry S. Bienen and Mark Gersovitz, "Consumer Subsidy Cuts, Violence, and Political Stability,"
Comparative Politics 19 (1986): 25-44.
17 See, for example, Manuel Pastor, Jr., "The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third World: Debate and
Evidence from Latin America," World Development 15 (1987): 249-262; Karen Remmer, "The Politics of
Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America: 1954-1984," Comparative Politics 19 (1986):
1-24; Barry J. Riddell, "Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
Journal of Modem African Studies 30 (March 1992): 53-69; Paul Mosely, "Policy-Making Without Facts: A
Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990," African Affairs 91 (April
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Traditionally, the IMF, and the WorId Bank as well, have attempted to
evade facing such issues by professional arguments of compartmentalization;
that is, by insisting that their mandate is economic, not political. But these
arguments rest on a strained and tendentious conception of "political," roughly
covered over by the sterile economic language of "negative externalities." For
example, displacing settled agricultural communities for a dam has been seen
as a nonpolitical, and unintended (although hardly unplanned), consequence of
important infrastructure development. Efforts to assure that these internally
displaced people can support themselves, however, are labeled political and
thus outside the proper scope of Bank economic planning. Likewise, rising
malnutrition from externally mandated cuts in food subsidies are dismissed as
an extraneous "political" considerations, when in fact economic planners have
("indirectly") caused this suffering. That the social and political consequences
of a development project or SAP mandated policy are "exogenous" to the
economic model being used by IPI planners does not absolve them of political
and moral responsibility for the predictable, and even unpredicted,
consequences of the actions they recommend.
To the (considerable ) extent that such narrow and self-serving conceptions
of the political continue to inform international financial institution activities,
self-monitoring of NED participation in IPIs can draw attention to the human
rights consequences of such "business as usuaL." Furthermore, changes in
recent years, especially in the WorId Bank, provide additional entry points for
monitors to pressure for improvements. For example, the Bank's formal
recognition of the special roles and needs of women in development provides
an opportunity to press for greater efforts on behalf of women's rights, which
are of special interest to the NEDs. The more recent adoption of "good
governance" rhetoricI8 has incorporated at least some concern for civil and
political rights into the mandate of the Bank.
Human rights are already an inescapable part of the work of the W orId
Bank, the IMF, and other IPIs. Evaluating NED contributions to how that work
is carried out -- for example, practices with respect to the mix between
infrastructure and basic human needs lending, the particular kinds of women
and development projects encouraged or supported, or the details of SAPs n
therefore, is essential. But the task of monitoring and assessing NED activities
in this area is not an easy one. For example, the linkage between IMF
decisions and the activities of other multilateral organizations (e.g., regional
development banks and the WorId Bank), lender c1ubs, and national trade and
aid bureaucracies greatly complicates the picture.
The most fundamental problem, however, is a decision making system
based on contribution (and thus economic size). This both complicates and
restricts the capabilities of the NEDs to influence outcomes. Here, however,
our earIier comments on consistency and witness seem relevant. Furthermore,
1992): 227-241; and Joan M. Nelson, "Poverty, Equality, and the Politics of Adjustment," in Stephan Haggard
and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992).
18 See, for example, The World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 1994).
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pressure to increase the democratic accountability of the Bank and the Fund
might be an area of NED leadership. At the very least, self-monitoring should
highlight the irony of limited IMF accountabilty, given the emphasis in its
structural adjustment rhetoric on increasing government accountability.
We are inc1ined to recommend a two track system of monitoring NED
participation in IPIs: general monitoring of structural adjustment practices and
case studies in countries where one or more of the NEDs has been unusually
active. A case study approach would also encourage an examination of
relationships between bilateral and multilateral. aid practices. This may also be
an area where the cooperating institutes could initiate important collaborative
work with paralleI development institutes.
In a comprehensive system of self-monitoring, NED activities in other
multilateral aid arenas would also have to be considered. Among the more
prominent organizations are regional development banks, UNDP, and aid
activities of the EU (especially under the Lomé conventions). In addition,
activities in multilateral trading bodies (EU, GATT, WTO) and UN system
functional organizations (e.g., ILO, WFP, FAO, WHO, UNICEF) should be
considered. It is c1ear, though, that limited resources would permit such an
extensive reach only in relatively narrow case studies.
b. Other Multilateral Agencies
In the post-Cold War worId, multilateral peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and even humanitarian intervention have become a recurrent, and
increasingly regularized, part of the landscape. For example, major multilateral
operations in Somalia and Rwanda suggest an increased wilingness of the
international community to intervene in cases of genocide and severe
humanitarian crisis. The explicit inclusion of human rights monitoring in the
mandates of United Nations operations in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Mozambique and Guatemala suggests a deeper penetration of human rights
concerns into multilateral peace and security issues. Certainly future
multilateraloperations are a fit subject for coverage. Future editors might also
want to consider inc1uding essays that explore some general issues raised by
these multilateral humanitarian initiatives, especially given the distinctive light
that might be thrown on them by HRDC's focus on the links between human
rights and development.
A self-monitoring strategy would also require attention to the worId's
refugeeproblem and the. NEDs. contributions to its solution. . Most obviously,
this would mean monitoring NED activities carried out under the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Our earIier arguments on consistency and
sensitivity, however, also strongly suggest inc1uding an examination of NED
policies for admitting refugees and other displaced persons, and their treatment
when they arrive. Consideration might also have to be given to NED
citizenship laws, and to the possibilties both of refugees and economic
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migrants joining as equal citizens in hitherto homogeneous societies such as
Norway and Austria (since 1945).19
3. Transnational Actors
In addition to offcial bilateral and multilateral foreign policy, a comprehensive
system of self-monitoring must also consider transnational relations; that is,
international activities of private individuals and groups. ParticularIy in our
shrinking worId of increasing interdependence, it is important to take into
account the human rights consequences of the transnational activities of private
actors that are nation als of or based in the NEDs.
a. Transnational Businesses
Banks and corporations are obvious candidates for such examination. In 1993
the stock value of the 1,000 largest corporations in the worId included USD
153 bilion in the NetherIands and USD 70 bilion in Sweden. Dutch MNCs
had USD 132 bilion in foreign direct investment in 1992.i° These are quite
significant sums. Although there has been much talk about the human rights
obligations of transnational corporations (TNCs), action has been rare. We
suggest that HRDC take the initiative in beginning to monitor the human rights
consequences of TNC activities.
This wil involve a special emphasis on w orkers , rights, the domain of
human rights most immediately related to the activities of transnational
corporations. At least three bodies of principles and practices provide potential
guidance for such monitoring: national rules in the host country, national rules
in the home country, and international standards (most notably, International
Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and recommendations). This diversity
of standards, however, raises difficult issues of consistency.
Host country rules often fall far short of what is expected in the home
country. A direct application of NED home country standards would
sometimes be financial suicide. In any case, if imposed by NED governments
it would likely be perceived as interventionary extraterritorial legislation. Yet
extreme divergences between the national and international employment
practices of NED TNCs raise important issues of moral consistency.
One obvious strategy to assure minimal consistency would be to apply
universal guidelines. Discussions are currently taking place between employers
and. trade unions withinthelLOto devise aset ofcore "superstandards 11
19 Gudmund Hernes and Knud Knudsen, "Norwegians' Attitudes Toward New Immigrants", Acta Sociologica,
vol. 35 (1992), pp. 123-39; Rudiger Wischenbart, "National Identity and Immigration in Austria -- Historical
Framework and Political Dispute", West European Politics 17, (April 1994), pp. 72-90; Hans van Amersfoort
and Rinus Penninx, "Regulating Migration in Europe: The Dutch Experience, 1960-92", Annals (AAPSS) 534
(July 1994), pp. 133-146.
20 AFL-CIO Economic Research Department, Multinational Corporations: Expanding Influence in the 1990s
(February 1995), pp. 3 and 5.
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applicable in all underdeveloped countries. The OECD has maintained a set of
voluntar guidelines for TNCs since 1976.21
A second strategy would involve applying host country standards. But
rather than use (of ten weak) local legal minimums, attention should be focused
on business practices in the local market, with the expectation that NED firms
operate at or near the level of the most progressive companies -- although such
localized standards should not be allowed to fall below universal guidelines or
superstandards. The aim would be to as sure that NED firms are held to more
than a lowest common denominator. This would also bu ild in a progressive
dynamic: requirements would rise along with the general level of national
practice.22
TNCs are not only employers, they are also investors. As such, their
activities can have profound repercussions on local populations. Land
purchases can have the effect of displacing local populations from their
traditional lands. Taxes can be paid, or deferred or avoided. Investments in
Southern countries, moreover, are often tied to corruption and bribery,
involving firms as partisan actors in local politics.
The human rights obligations of private financial institutions also merit
careful consideration. Banking and banking practices can have enormous,
sudden and of ten devastating effects on the economic rights of individuals.
There is also the question of how private financial actors intluence IFIs.
b. Nongovernmental Organizations
Other sorts of transnational groups based in the NEDs may have an impact on
human rights in Southern countries. Trade unions may engage in training and
support activities. Churches eng age in both missionary and humanitarian work.
Human rights NGOs are active abroad. There are severe practical limits on
even attempting to monitor the full range of NGO activity with a potential
impact on human rights. Nonetheless, monitors need to be sensitive to the
possibilty that particular groups may be important in individual countries.
Special attention should be focused on the activities of private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) that engage in development and humanitarian work.
These groups can have a direct and immediate impact on living conditions in
local communities. And to the extent that offcial bilateral and multlateral
development assistance is channeled through NGOs/PVOs, the distinction
between public and private actors is eroding.
c. Private Citizens
Proper monitoring of the full extent of human rights violations by Northerners
would also include the actions of individual NED citizens. Private citizens can
21 AFL-CIO,op. eit., p. 15.
22 This is analogous to the practice of "evolutive interpretation" in the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights, in which the European Convention is interpreted according to contemporary standards, rather
than those in effect at the time of drafting (1954).
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have an international human rights impact through their purchases, their
traveIs, and their voluntary activities.
Travel, even if undertaken purely for private pleasure, may have unintendèd
human rights consequences. Tourism to countries with repressive political
regimes may have help to stabilize those regimes, by injecting hard currency
into the economy or legitimizing the country as a place to travel. Tourists'
activities can have a severe environmental impact, as when resources such as
game parks are diverted to their use, thus limiting the resources available to
locals. Tourists' purchases can also reduce the available supply of scarce goods
needed by locals.
One obvious area of exploitation is sex tourism. Beyond the unhealthy labor
conditions of the sex industries of Thailand, China, and Burma, girIs and young
women are of ten effectively enslaved, having been abducted or purchased from
their familes. Most, who are seen as degraded by their labor, have no effective
option to return to mainstream society. While there is disagreement between
those who wish to abolish prostitution and those who wish merely to regulate
it, no one doubts that sex tourism relies heavily on the exploitation of young
girIs and boys under the age of consent.23 Sweden, Norway and Denmark
already have laws permitting them to prosecute citizens who pay for sex with
children in other countries.24 Monitors could report on application of the law
and could investigate whether there was a general reduction in sex tourism.
At home as well as abroad, private citizens engage in actions with potential
human rights consequence, especially in their role as consumers. NED
monitors might wish to review the human rights situation in countries from
which the NEDs buy products. A less demanding but stil valuable approach
would be to examine exports from countries that have become objects of
special human rights concern.
No society can avoid purchasing every product produced in rights-abusive
situations. But a monitoring system that brought to the attention of citizens of
the NEDs some of the worst cases of abuse of Third W orId laborers, such as
the child labour that weaves some Asian carpets or wages for textile workers in
Central America that do not even cover minimum nutritional needs, might
encourage consumers to purchase other products or from other suppliers. And,
as in other contexts, opportunities to acknowledge and reward good performers
should not be overIooked. Self-monitoring might then become a resource for
popular mobilzation in monitors' own countries. In any case, this home
country consumer dimension would complement pressures brought to bear on
TNCs to improve their labor practices.
Private citizens also have many dealings with citizens and officials of
rights-abusive countries through sports, cultural exchanges, and educational
exchanges. Here, the role of monitors might be, again, to inform their fellow
citizens of the circumstances surrounding those relations and of the possible
human rights consequences of their activities. The Special Committee on
23 Laura Reanda, "Prostitution as a Human Rights Question: Problems and Prospects of United Nations
Action" Human Rights Quarterly, 13,2 (1991), pp. 202-228.
24 The Globe and Mai! (Toronto), April 4, 1996, p. A5.
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Apartheid, which developed an extensive system to publicize and thus curtail
cultural and sporting contacts with South Africa in the 1980s, provides a model
for such activities.
The stretch from the activities of private NED citizens to human rights
might sometimes be long. But from the point of view of Southern critics, the
Northern human rights movement is tainted by inattention to the many ways in
which the activities of Northerners affect the well-being of Southerners. To
take these matters seriously in human rights monitoring would be astriking
example of the balanced, self-critical approach we advocated above.
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c. Monitoring, assessment, and advocacy
Having gathered the relevant information, the next step is to put it to use in
assessing practice. Evidence does not speak for itself, except perhaps in the
most egregious cases. In our view, monitors have an obligation to draw
conclusions about state practice. And such assessments wil figure heavily in
the (at least implicit) advocacy of improved human rights policies that has
always been a part of HRDC.
Above we touched on some issues of assessment, especially the problems of
moral and political consistency and the importance of using authoritative
international norms (and thus respecting the interdependence and indivisibility
of all classes of human rights). We have also stressed the importance of
comprehensiveness in assessment; considering both action and inaction; and
examining the mix between positive inducements and negative sanctions. Here
we want to extend some of these arguments and explore further some problems
posed by multiple objectives and perspectives.
Although international human rights norms are universal, it would be
unrealistic to expect uniform practices in all countries. In assessing NED
responses to human rights conditions abroad, we need to know what it would
be reasonable for the NEDs to ask for or aspire to, taking into account available
resources, recipient country priorities, and their own priorities.
A vailable resources are an obvious dimension of appropriate variation in
expectations. For example, the range of services that can be expected in
implementing the right to health care wil be very different in a country with an
extremely low per capita income than in one with much higher incomes. In a
very low income country, aid might be channeled to primary rural health care,
which most closely fits NED values. If the government in question were to
insist instead on emphasizing health care services for a privileged urban elite,
human rights considerations would suggest moving resources to another sector,
or perhaps even another country.
Some variations, however, seem appropriate even in countries with similar
per capita incomes. For example, Singapore has emphasized state support for
housing more than many other countries in its region. As this falls within
general NED priorities, it would be reasonable to support these Singaporean
initiatives.
The foundation provided by past practices also needs to be taken into
account. A country that has only recently emerged from decades of militar
dictatorship is likely to have very different legal capabilities, political
traditions, and substantive problems than a country that has considerable recent
experience with multi party electoral politics, however weak or imperfect. And
particular experiences in individual countries may crucially define the range of
reasonable human rights expectations. Cambodia's history of Kher Rouge
politicide, Vietnamese occupation, and pro-democracy international
CMI-report 21
intervention significantly distinguishes it from its neighbors, however similar
they may otherwise be. The differing ways in which Vietnam, Laos, and
Thailand were affected by American military involvement in the 1960s and
1970s also cannot be overlooked.
Such variations in what can reasonably be expected from the targets of one's
human rights policies further complicate the problem of consistency. It is a
matter of art more than science to determine the right mix between the
universal and the particular, the desirable and the possible, and human rights
and other concerns. Even -- or perhaps especially -- where reasonable
judgments may differ, HRDC can contribute to getting the mix "right" by
self-monitoring that goes beyond laying out the facts to advancing a particular
assessment.
Policies and practices represent at least implicit decisions about how to
balance competing objectives and perspectives. Monitors need to place those
decisions under scrutiny. Is the NED government as king too much (or too
litte) of a particular country? Are there areas of value convergence that might
be pursued? Are there opportunities for greater impact that have not be en
explored? Questions of means also need to be addressed. Have improvements
been appropriately noted and rewarded? Failures? Regressions?
Comprehensive monitoring provides the basis for answering such questions.
Even if monitors and governments disagree on the answers, by regularIy asking
such questions HRDC can at least contribute to more thoughtful and thoroughly
examined government policies.
Carefully designed international human rights policies must also select
particular countries to emphasize. Middle power aid policies have tended to
prefer sustained involvement, in a small number of countries that share basic
social and political values with the donor countries.2S Extending this to human
rights policies, as has of ten been done, would seem both morally appropriate
and instrumentally sound (given the limited resources of these countries). But
other strategic considerations must also be addressed.
For example, to what extent wil severity of problems be emphasized? It
might be argued that scarce resources should be focused where the problem is
most extreme. But this may perversely reward countries that have performed
poorIy, and punish those who have done relatively well. Conversely, it might
be argued that regardless of the severity of the problem, attention ought to be
focused on those cases where the likely impact is greatest. But this may
perversely consign those suffering the most to oblivion, and arbitrarily assist
those who happen to reside in countries with established relations with the
NEDs.
How governments handle such complex decisions is an important subject
for monitors to address. Taking into account our comments about the
importance of comprehensive assessment, monitors must look as well at, for
25 See, for example, Olav Stokke (ed.), Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the
Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell
International, 1989). Of course, other considerations, such as economic interests, international political pressures,
and (in the case ofthe Netherlands) former colonial ties, have also been important. But there has been a sustained
effort to emphasize shared values in the chose of aid partners.
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example, the implicit and explicit priorities of NED PVOs. And they must ask
whether NED firms operating in the country are making an appropriate
contribution to, for example, improving the health care available to workers
and their families and communities.
The proper mIx between need, witness, interest, and potential efficacy is,
again, ultimately a political matter. Although monitors obviously cannot
provide authoritative answers, they should draw attention to, and perhaps also
question, the implicit and explicit valuations apparent in the actions and
inactions of NED governments, firms, NGOs, and citizens. For example, now
that South Africa is free from apartheid, what should NED government policies
be with respect to trade and investment? Should public and private
development assistance channeled to the front line states in the 1980s be
reallocated elsewhere today? Should firms that pulled out of South Africa
return? Do those who disinvested have an obligation to consider reinvestment?
Should citizens who in the 1980s would have safaried in Botswana now go to
South Africa?
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E. The NEDs as human rights leaders
We are painfully aware that comprehensive monitoring and assessment is
extraordinarily demanding of time and other resources. Monitors no less than
governments must act within their capabilities and limitations. Future editors
wil face difficult strategic decisions in seeking to produce comprehensive
reviews of policies in a wide range of forums.
ClearIy only a small number of cases can be considered each year. But there
are a great variety of bases on which to select cases. For example, the yearbook
might look at five bilateral cases, each institute considering relations between
its own government and a single country. Conversely, it might take a few
recipient countries and compare the policies of all five states -- and other
governments, and multilateral organizations, as well. Single country or
comparative studies of policies in a particular multilateral setting might also be
aregular feature of the yearbook.
We are convinced, though, that however these decisions are ultimately
made, the shift to a self-monitoring focus wil be productive. HRDC wil
reposition itself as a leading forum for the study of the international relations of
human rights. The sponsoring institutes wil be focusing their attentions where
they have both the greatest responsibility and the greatest likelihood of impact
-- at home. And they wil, implicitly at least, be pressing their countries to take
on a new international human rights leadership role.
We particularly want to emphasize the stress on economic, social, and
cultural rights in the new HRDC we have envisioned. As the socialist and
communist criticism of human rights that was prominent in the 1970s has lost
its power, many have come to view the forces of capitalism as a panacea for
human rights problems. We worry that well founded criticisms of the
inefficiencies of command economies may lead to unthinking reliance on the
market to provide economic and social rights automatically.
Countries with strong social democratic traditions are particularIy well
positioned to remind the worId of the inequities of unregulated markets and to
insist that economic rights are not seen as subordinate to or an automatic
consequence of civil and political rights. The forces of social change that may
eventually result in rights-protective societies may indeed rely heavily on
markets and civil and political rights. Nevertheless, real people suffer, starve,
and die in the present when economic rights are ignored, denied, or
unattainable. They cannot wait for the "trickle down" from newly-efficient
markets to raise their standard of living. Nor can they wait for younger people
and future generations to demand the civil and political rights that may protect
the economic rights of their descendants. We hope that HRDC wil be a
leading voice for keeping these essential facts at the heart of the international
human rights debate.
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The other area of leadership is one that we have already stressed above but
is worthy of final re-emphasis here, namely, taking more seriously the
responsibility of the North for human rights conditions in the South. This does
not mean ritual breast-beating in expiation for the sin of imperialism. Nor does
it mean disregarding or downplaying the capacity of indigenous political and
economic actors to violate the human rights of theIr own people, even in the
most poverty-stricken countries. It does mean that those in the North look
closely at how both their governmeIits and their corporate and private citizens
might be violating, undermining, supporting, or contributing to the realization
of the human rights of people living in the South.
This is particularly important for economic, social, and cultural rights, where
actions that violate or undermine others' human rights are often unintentional.
It is also especially important for private corporations and individuals, who
are rarely asked to account for the international human rights consequences of
their behavior. Even if firms rarely set out to deny economic rights, their profit
seeking activities may easily lead to that result. And in the pursuit of profit,
they often ignore opportunities to improve human rights conditions in the
places where they produce, sell, and invest. Likewise, the largely "impersonal"
social forces that produce highly unequal distributions of wealth between (and
within) North and South ne ed to be made personaL. And they need to be made
personal in away that does not paralyse citizens with guilt, but rather informs
them of options that might improve the enjoyment of human rights abroad.
We believe that the governments and citizens of the NEDs, always
forward-looking in the human rights field, are well placed to respond to these
challenges. We therefore encourage future editors of HRDC to, in effect, ask
of them that they 1ead.
I
i
,.
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Appendix: New directions for the "old way"
Following are some recommendations to improve the "old way" of external
monitoring of the human rights practices of ai d-recipient countries, in case the
NED human rights institutes retain this approach.
A. Improving Efficiency
As already noted, there is considerable overlap with efforts by such
organizations as Human Rights Watch, especially in the area of civil and
political rights. To free resources for more original and creative work, we
suggest that borrowing from these organizations' reviews, sharing information
where possible, and reviewing the quality of their work would be more sensible
than starting de nova each year to review country performance.
Whatever reporting is done should also give greater attention to developing
a consistent time series by which change can be measured. In the late 1980s,
HRDC appeared to focus on a few countries, monitoring their human rights
performance on an annual basis. By the early 1990s, however, the countries
monitored varied significantly from year to year. If an annual volume of
reports on recipient countries is to continue, there needs to be a more logical
basis for choice of countries. These choices could reflect changes in donor
country policies and practices, such as government decisions on aid priorities.
They could also, however, reflect priorities generated by the monitors
themselves.
B. Reliance on Regional Human Rights Standards
Jf the "old way" is continued, we recommend using regional as well as
international human rights law in assessing Southern human rights
performance. That these regional codes are indigenously generated helps reduce
the perception of cultural imperialism, when monitors compare practice to
standards. We applaud the efforts already made by HRDC to rely on such
regional standards.
In discussing self-monitoring, we emphasized moral consistency and
cultural sensitivity. These two goals apply equally to external monitoring. In
fact, they seem even more pressing in the case of external monitoring.
Cultural sensitivity and moral consistency sometimes seem incompatible
.goals. ....Cultural. .sensitivity mighLrequire .that. indigenouscustoms regarding
women be respected, while moral consistency would require that they be
criticized. But cultural sensitivity and moral consistency are far less
incompatible if human rights monitors refer to international documents that
Southern governments have signed, and to indigenously-generated human
rights codes. Claims thatcustoms that violate human rights are immutable
parts of Southern "cultures" are of ten contradicted by regional human rights
laws against them. Respect for Southern cultures, then, would require Northern
26 CMI-report
monitors to refer to international standards that contradict local standards only
in cases of violations of human rights that are not prohibited by regional law.
C. Reverse Monitoring
We also recommend that if the NED monitoring project continues as it has in
the past, it consider what we call "reverse monitoring. " In revers e monitoring,
the donor country's human rights practices would be monitored by a national or
group from a recipient country. One means of doing this might be through
matched pairing: a monitor from the donor country would assess the human
rights practices of an aid-recipient country, and a monitor from the recipient
country would assess donor country human rights practices.
This person would also take part in defining criteria for monitoring, not only
of recipient but also of the donor country's practices. The revers e monitor
might wish to focus on issues that are not traditionally thought of as human
rights questions; for example, the treatment of immgrants and refugees in
Northern host countries. The revers e monitor might also wish to focus on
questions of North-South justice.
Without careful and respectful inclusion of reverse monitors in all aspects of
the monitoring process, especially decision-making about priorities, the
exercise might well appear as merely a symbolic gesture of political
correctness. But if done well and seriously, it may produce changes in
monitoring policy. And it may lessen the feeling among many in aid-recipient
countries that human rights monitoring is a particularIy offensive aspect of
Western cultural imperialism.
D. Support Recipient Country Monitoring Groups
NED monitors might also wish to consider shifting responsibility as much as
they can to local human rights monitors within aid-recipient countries
themselves. In general, we believe that the time is past for foreigners to be the
main actors responsible for human rights monitoring in underdeveloped
countries. This practice is increasingly offensive in its imputation that local
citizens are unconcerned with human rights or incapable of monitoring their
own countries' practices.
There may also be substantive advantages. National monitors might be
more sensitive than outsiders to local context. Without undermining human
......rights standards,theymay be.better,.positionedto take into aCGount the history,
trends and particular needs of localhuman rights protection. Indigenous
monitors may pay more attention than foreign to economic rights. Alternately,
they may stress civil and political rights, believing them to be the key to overall
human rights protection. Should they choose the latter course, they wil be less
open than outsiders to the charge that they are trying to "impose" the liberal
democratic way of life on their countries. Internal debate on how to implement
human rights wil be encouraged, without the extra layer of resentment against
Northern cultural imperialism.
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Transfer of the monitoring activity to nationals of the monitored countries
might lessen the difficulties of criticizing practices known to be cultural in
origin. Sensitive foreign monitors often wish to avoid advocating particular
human rights that national cultures might find offensive. National monitors
might agree with this approach, permitting some rights-violative customs such
as child betrothal that they considered not to be gross violations. But as
insiders in their own societies, national monitors might institute a lively debate
over whether even such truly indigenous customs should be banned. They may
be far less tolerant of their own cultural practices than those schooled in the
philosophy of cultural sensitivity.
Even if monitoring activities are transferred to indigenous human rights
activists, there wil still be a strong support role for Northerners. Many
countries stil suffer under stronger or weaker forms of dictatorial or
authoritarian rule. Thus, human rights monitoring can often be difficult for
locals, if not dangerous to them personally. Local monitors, then, can stil
benefit from outsiders' material and moral support.
